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Article 3

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW WRIT LARGE

LOUIS FISHER*
Classes in Constitutional Law focus largely, if not exclusively, on court
cases. The attention falls more on federal courts than state courts, more on the
U.S. Supreme Court than lower federal courts. As a result of this evernarrowing process, constitutional law comes to mean what a majority of five
Justices, or perhaps a plurality of four, happen to decide on a given day. Until
that majority or plurality changes its mind, students are told that the meaning
of the Constitution is fixed and final. Teaching in this manner relegates all
other political institutions, all fifty states, all individuals and all public groups
to the sidelines. That is not the way the legal system works.
I. A LIMITED CLASSROOM EXPERIENCE
Through this case-bound process, students learn constitutional law not
according to what the Constitution provides, nor what the framers intended,
nor what actually happens in American society, but by what the Supreme Court
says. Cases are analyzed, dissected, and plumbed for meaning. It is as though
in this complex, dynamic democratic republic we all wait for the “great issues”
to percolate up to the Court, which proceeds to instruct us, private citizen or
public official, what the Constitution really means. Some of us read the
decisions as best we can. Others hear about them through the media. All of us
then go on with our lives.
The Constitution has never functioned in this manner and never should,
and yet it has been standard practice for many years for law schools to teach
Constitutional Law this way. Political science professors used to offer a richer
fare, making students aware of broad historical and political forces, but in
recent decades they have fallen into the same bad habit as law schools. Part of
the reason given is that many undergraduate students in Con Law classes will
attend law school. Thus, if law schools adopt a stilted, unrealistic teaching
method, the goal at the undergraduate level is to fully prepare students for the
same cramped, artificial, case-only approach. This is not education, and it is

* Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Congressional Research Service, the Library of
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interpreted as positions of the Congressional Research Service or the Library of Congress.
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certainly not education that allows students to function effectively as citizens
or lawyers.
There are obvious advantages to the narrow methodology used in
undergraduate classes and law schools. It is far easier to teach Constitutional
Law by paying attention to a single branch and even easier to focus solely on
the U.S. Supreme Court and ignore important developments that occur in lower
federal courts and state courts. Through this single-shot approach, the
professor and the students need not be aware of contributions by Congress, the
President, executive agencies, the states, or the general public. I know of many
law professors, quite distinguished, who are dumbfounded when I tell them
that a constitutional decision issued by the U.S. Supreme Court has been (1)
trumped by a congressional statute, (2) eviscerated by agreements reached
between executive agencies and congressional committees, or (3) entirely
tossed to the side by a state supreme court that decides to follow the state
constitution rather than the U.S. Supreme Court. How can that be, these
professors object, until I show them that it is.
Constitutional Law should not be taught as equivalent to judicial
supremacy. The framers, in establishing a republic, did not intend for the U.S.
Supreme Court to be the final and only word on constitutional matters. There
are no grounds for thinking that Chief Justice John Marshall, the great author
of Marbury v. Madison,1 ever believed in concentrating such power and
authority in the Court.2 Second, our system of constitutional law has never
functioned that way. Elementary examples from U.S. history are available to
show how and why. Third, we should not want final authority vested in the
Court. Placing such expectations and demands on Justices is unrealistic and
unwise. The American political system functions best when a number of
constitutional issues are addressed exclusively outside the courts, and even if
courts decide the matter it is often the case that the dispute reenters the
political stream and is fundamentally reshaped at that level. Judges, aware of
this circular and convoluted process, are not offended. They understand that
their role is to announce general principles, leaving ample room for political
institutions and the public to find practical ways of both applying and shaping
the law.
Students who leave school need to understand their civic duties in order to
participate actively in a constitutional order. Respect for the law does not
mean blind obeisance to judicial rulings. Citizens who objected to slavery or
child labor could not look for guidance to such cases as Dred Scott v.
Sandford3 or Hammer v. Dagenhart.4 They had every right to work in concert

1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. See LOUIS FISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 33–43 (6th ed. 2005).
3. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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with others to make sure that those decisions did not remain the law of the
land. There was no reason to expect Roe v. Wade5 to be the final word on
abortion. It was only a matter of time before the Court, subjected to powerful
pressures from the public, would give ground and jettison the trimester
framework.6 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has written about the “dynamic
dialogue between the Court and the American public,” remarking that no one
considered Roe “to have settled the issue for all time.”7 A public that “docilely
and unthinkingly approved every Supreme Court decision as infallible and
immutable would, I believe, have severely disappointed our founders.”8 The
Court’s decision in 1972 struck down the death penalty, but only
momentarily.9 The majority of states promptly restored the death penalty with
new procedures, and the Court accommodated those public judgments.10
When citizens serve as jurors, they must form independent judgments not
merely in deciding whether the prosecutors carried their burden but also in
applying abstract legal doctrines to a particular case. What is entrapment? Did
the government use tactics to manufacture a crime, encouraging someone to
violate a law? Judges can explain to the jury the technical grounds for
entrapment, but it is the juror who decides whether the government
overstepped. A juror, by voting to acquit, can send a powerful message that
the government abused its powers.11 The courts can issue all the guidelines
they want about the meaning of pornography and obscenity, but it is the juror
who eventually decides whether a book, movie, art exhibit, or musical
performance is harmful to their home community. Through this process,
citizens sitting as jurors have the final word.
Similarly, attorneys who leave law school must be prepared to navigate
inside the courts and outside, operating both at the level of the national
government and the states. In an effort to remedy a constitutional error, they
might first have to look for relief within an executive agency. If they fail there
and later in the courts, resourceful lawyers can turn to Congress or the state
legislature to prevail. Those were the steps taken to allow Captain Simcha
Goldman of the Air Force to wear his yarmulke indoors on duty. After having
his argument for religious freedom rejected by the Air Force and the Supreme

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

247 U.S. 251 (1918).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW 45 (2003).
Id.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
FISHER, supra note 2, at 680–81.
NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 37–40 (2004).
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Court, his attorney worked with Congress to fashion remedial legislation.12 I
have talked with many professors who teach Constitutional Law in political
science departments and law schools who are familiar with the Goldman case
but know nothing about the congressional legislation.
Did Congress overstep by finding in favor of Goldman after the Court
found against him? Not at all. The Court merely decided that Goldman’s
religious liberty did not outweigh the Air Force’s need for military discipline,
unity, and order. The decision did not end the matter. Under the Constitution,
it is Congress, not the Court, that is empowered “[t]o make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”13 The Justices
decided the conflict between Air Force needs and religious freedom one way,
and Congress had every right to decide it the opposite way. If someone wants
to understand the scope of religious liberty in the military, they need to look
not at the Court’s decision but at the congressional statute.
II. AH, YES, THE TEXT
How much time is spent in Constitutional Law classes actually reading the
Constitution? From my experience, it cannot be much. In the late 1980s, I
gave a talk at a law school, explaining how the Constitution assigns important
powers of war and foreign affairs to Congress, not to the President. I had
barely begun when a second-year law student cut me off, his face flushed with
anger, asking with annoyance: “Doesn’t the Constitution give the President the
power to declare war, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate?” I was
far more unnerved by this strikingly false understanding than by the
interruption. Afterwards, I remained troubled by the thought that this student
did not manufacture or invent the misconception. Created elsewhere, it was in
the air ready to be picked up and repeated by anyone.
To prevent this kind of error, or at least nip it in the bud, I know professors
who tell students to read Articles I and II in preparation for the next class,
which will discuss the allocation of power over foreign affairs. Students
expect to find in Article II language that gives the power over foreign affairs
and national security to the President. To their great surprise, it is not there.
The key powers are vested in Congress, or shared between the Senate and the
President.
Misconceptions about the war power are not limited to students. Early in
1999, on my way home from work, I listened to a speech that former President
George Bush was giving to Senators. In discussing the difficult negotiations in
1990 leading to a congressional statute authorizing military action against Iraq,
12. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); Pub. L. No. 100–180, § 508, 101 Stat.
1086–87 (1987); FISHER, supra note 2, at 571–72, 576–80.
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
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I heard him say there was a difference of opinion as to who had the power to
declare war. Had I heard him correctly? How could there be a difference of
opinion over something spelled out with precision and clarity in Article I? Did
Bush stray from the text of the speech and make a careless error? The next
day, I read the speech and his language was unambiguous: “[T]here was a
fundamental difference of opinion between the Senate and the White House
over the Senate’s role in declaring war—one that dated back to the War
Powers Act [of 1973].”14
How extraordinary. Bush earned a degree in economics from Yale
University, served in the House of Representatives from 1967 to 1971, became
ambassador to the United Nations, chairman of the Republican National
Committee, ambassador to China, Director of Central Intelligence, Vice
President for eight years, and President for four. Throughout all that time in
public service, and after taking the oath to support and defend the Constitution
on so many occasions, he did not know which branch had the power to declare
war.
The “difference of opinion” between the Senate and the White House over
declaring war did not “date back” to the War Powers Act of 1973. It dates
back to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and the ratification debates that
placed the power to declare war in Congress. There was never a dispute about
“the Senate” declaring war. That power rests with both Houses of Congress.
Ignorance by a law school student is disquieting, but much more disturbing is
to learn that a President, after long public service, is unaware of a fundamental
constitutional principle that he was called upon to exercise.
III. THE ILLUSION OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
For the past four decades I have made it my practice, whenever possible, to
enter into a dialogue with political science and law professors who believe that
the U.S. Supreme Court is, and should be, the final voice on constitutional
matters. As my examples mount up, particularly on the many issues that are
handled almost exclusively by the executive and legislative branches, the
professors will reluctantly concede that disputes over separation of powers and
federalism are indeed profoundly influenced by the elected branches, and in
some cases decisively so. But here they firmly draw a line. Congress and the
President may have the dominant say on structural issues between the two
branches, or between the national government and the states, but surely only
the courts have the ultimate authority to decide matters of individual rights. It
stands to reason, they say, that the majoritarian process followed by the
political branches can never be trusted to protect minority rights.

14. 145 CONG. REC. S957-01 (1999).
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I then explain why even this fallback position cannot survive scrutiny. In
numerous areas, the political branches do a much better job of protecting
individual rights and minority rights than the courts. Eyebrows dance in
disbelief at this wild claim, but if my friend, or someone who had been my
friend, will hear me out, I will identify many situations over the past two
centuries where the regular political process has done exceedingly well in
protecting individual rights, often better than the courts, and federal and state
judges are often quite happy to see a vexatious matter resolved by other
parties. Citizens and lawyers should not look automatically and unflinchingly
to the courts for final answers to constitutional controversies.
Toward the end of the Clinton administration, I was invited by a friend in
the Justice Department to give a luncheon talk to attorneys in the Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC). In the room sat the cream of the crop: skilled
governmental lawyers with the most refined grasp of constitutional issues.
About two dozen people attended, most of them career attorneys, but several of
those present were political appointees who regularly circulate in and out of
OLC. They understood that I would be talking about constitutional law in its
broader sense, particularly the legitimate and authoritative actors that are
outside the courts. After joining the Congressional Research Service in
September 1970, I immediately became involved in a number of constitutional
disputes and was often invited to testify before congressional committees,
write committee reports, and prepare floor statements on constitutional
analysis. At times, I was detailed to a committee for long stretches, such as the
House Iran-Contra Committee. Although I am a political scientist and not an
attorney, I had nonetheless participated actively on a host of issues over a
period of decades and could speak about personal experiences with
constitutional disputes.
I knew that as a congressional staffer, and particularly as a non-attorney, I
was walking into a lion’s den. I thus started with an example that I thought
would easily find common ground, and we could disagree on other matters.
Wrong. My “modest proposal” provoked unrelieved and unwavering
opposition from everyone in the room except one attorney who, perhaps out of
mercy or friendship, took my side. The disagreement lasted about fifteen
minutes until we let the matter drop and turned to other topics. On the
disagreement over the initial issue there was never any confusion or
misconception over terms or concepts. The issue was clear. We differed
fundamentally over judicial finality.
The example I started with concerned the independent counsel. Even
though the Supreme Court in Morrison v. Olson upheld the constitutionality of
the independent counsel,15 I said that if the statute lapsed and Congress decided
15. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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to reauthorize it, the President could veto the bill not merely on policy grounds,
but on reasons of constitutionality. The veto message could draw attention to
the Court’s reasoning, which held that whatever intrusion the independent
counsel made on presidential power, it did not “interfere impermissibly” with
the President’s “constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the
laws.”16 The President could then argue that over the decade following the
Court’s decision there had been ample evidence that the intrusion was more
than minimal. Besides, he could argue persuasively that it was his
responsibility, not the Court’s, to protect his office. It was his nondelegable
duty to make sure that presidential powers were not impaired by another
branch. This type of veto message would be a basic statement of the system of
checks and balances, giving life to the framers’ expectation that each branch
had an institutional right and need to fight off encroachments.
The OLC attorneys would not hear of it. They could envision a
presidential veto based on policy grounds but surely not on constitutional
grounds. To their mind, the constitutionality of the independent counsel had
already been decided, and no other branch could countermand a constitutional
decision of the Court, except of course by constitutional amendment. Short of
that, the decision must stand as superior law unless the Court decided to
reverse or modify its ruling. According to this framework, Congress and the
President were compelled to accept the Court’s supremacy. Otherwise, settled
law would yield to disorder and confusion and would undermine judicial
authority.
I found this reasoning unimpressive. I said that when the independent
counsel statute expired at the end of a four- or five-year life, members of
Congress would hold hearings to review the operation of the office and decide
whether it merited reauthorization. During this period, the lawmakers could
conclude that there were too many instances of constitutional abuse by an
overzealous independent counsel restrained by few checks from Congress, the
Justice Department, or the judiciary. Consequently, regardless of what the
Court had held in Morrison, Congress had every right to vote against
reauthorization on the basis of the record of constitutional problems that had
emerged. If Congress decided not to renew the independent counsel, the final
voice belonged to lawmakers, not to the Justices in Morrison. If there was no
reauthorization bill, there was nothing for the President to do but accept the
congressional judgment. Congress would have the last word unless a future
Congress decided to revisit the issue.
Taking the matter a step further, if members decided that on balance it was
appropriate to reauthorize the independent statute, the President had every right
to veto it as an unconstitutional intrusion on the powers of his office. Unless
16. Id. at 693.
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Congress overrode the veto, the final voice belonged to the President, not to
Congress or the Court. I asked the OLC attorneys what remedy would be
available if the President vetoed the bill on constitutional grounds and
Congress failed to override? Could a plaintiff bring the matter into court and
ask a judge to strike down the veto as an interference with judicial authority?
It seemed to me too far-fetched to take seriously.
I reminded the OLC attorneys about the parallel case of President Andrew
Jackson, who vetoed the U.S. Bank on constitutional grounds after several
Congresses, several Presidents, and the Supreme Court in McCulloch v.
Maryland had found the Bank to be constitutional.17 Jackson refused to bow to
those precedents. Every public officer, he said in his veto message in 1832,
took an oath to support the Constitution “as he understands it, and not as it is
understood by others.”18 The opinion of judges “has no more authority over
Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the judges, and on that point
the President is independent of both.”19
I found it curious that OLC attorneys, working within the Justice
Department, would defend judicial finality rather than presidential power.
Normally you would expect them to find arguments to protect and defend the
President’s power, and nothing could be more central than the President’s duty
to protect the prerogatives of his office and exercise the veto power vigorously.
At times the OLC has rejected efforts to expand presidential power when it
finds insufficient or unpersuasive constitutional grounds,20 but the President’s
right to veto on constitutional grounds has been exercised from the
beginning.21 As I looked around the room and saw faces of OLC attorneys
who were still in their twenties or early thirties, I realized that their entire
professional lives had been shaped either by law school or by clerking for
federal judges and Justices of the Supreme Court, where the dogma of judicial
finality had been drummed into them. With such training, they automatically
subordinated the President’s veto power if it conflicted with a court’s ruling.
IV. WHEN THE COURTS FIND CONSTITUTIONALITY
What the Court held in Morrison was this: If Congress and the President
wanted to create an independent counsel, the Court found no constitutional
violation. It follows that if Congress decided that the office was
17. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
18. FISHER, supra note 2, at 26. For excerpts of President Jackson’s veto and the Senate’s
debate over his veto message, see id. at 25–27.
19. Id. at 26.
20. See 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 128, 170 (1988) (rejecting the idea of an inherent item
veto for the President).
21. See LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT 119–24 (4th ed. 1997).
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constitutionally flawed, it did not have to pass it in the first place or reauthorize
it later. If the President decided the office encroached upon his executive
powers, he could veto the bill on constitutional grounds. None of those actions
by Congress or the President would show disrespect for the Court. Morrison
had given a green light and nothing more. The two elected branches were at
liberty to rethink and revisit the statute at any time and reach independent
judgments on the constitutionality of the office. A green light did not mean go.
It was merely a sign of permission. The two branches had full freedom to
debate the constitutionality of the independent counsel. In 1999, Congress
decided to let the office expire.
This kind of situation is seen elsewhere. After the Court finds that a statute
or procedure has no constitutional problems, Congress and the President can
decide whether, from their separate institutional perspectives, it is
constitutionally wise to proceed. An example is the handling of recess
appointments to the federal courts. The Constitution empowers the President
“to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by
granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.”22
The power to make recess appointments is general. It applies to both judicial
and nonjudicial positions. Challenges have been made in court, arguing that a
judge with a recess appointment lacks the independence of an Article III judge,
especially the quality of a lifetime appointment. Litigants thus have to argue
before a part-time judge. Also, the process circumvents the advice and consent
role of the Senate. Nonetheless, the constitutionality of federal recess judges
has been upheld by the lower courts.23
Like Morrison, these cases simply stand for the proposition that if the
President makes a recess appointment to a federal court, the judge has a
constitutional right to sit and decide cases. If a President decides that such
appointments create constitutional problems, he need not make them. If the
Senate wants to retaliate, it can. It could state that any individual who receives
a recess appointment to the federal courts will not be considered for a lifetime
appointment. If the President chooses to submit the nomination of a recess
judge for a lifetime position, the Senate could ignore it or vote it down 100 to
zero without holding hearings. These independent judgments by the elected
branches are entirely appropriate, and there is no check against them. Just
because the courts have thus far found no constitutional problems with federal
recess judges does not mean that the practice must be constitutionally
acceptable to the President or to the Senate.

22. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
23. See Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Woodley, 751
F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986); United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d
704 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 964 (1963).
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In 1972, agents from the Treasury Department’s Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms Bureau presented grand jury subpoenas to two banks where a suspect
maintained accounts. Without advising the depositor that subpoenas had been
served, the banks supplied the government with microfilms of checks, deposit
slips, and other records. In United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court held
that a Fourth Amendment interest could not be vindicated in court by
challenging such a subpoena.24 The Court treated the materials as business
records of a bank, not private papers of a person.25 End of story? Not quite.
Congress responded by passing the Right to Financial Privacy Act of
1978.26 Congressman Charles Whalen explained that the primary purpose of
the statute was to prevent warrantless government searches of bank and credit
records that reveal the nature of one’s private affairs.27 The government
should not have access “except with the knowledge of the subject individual or
else with the supervision of the courts.”28 The fact that the Court was satisfied
did not mean that Congress had to be satisfied. Congressman John Rousselot
remarked about the responsibility of Congress to redress the shortcomings of
the Court’s decision: “Automatic standing to challenge the release of
information in a court of law is provided for in section 1110, which, as a
practical matter, reverses the holding in the Miller case.”29 In essence, certain
safeguards to Fourth Amendment rights that were unavailable because of a
Supreme Court decision were now secured by congressional action.
V. FINDING UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
These examples illustrate that when the judiciary decides that an office
such as the independent counsel is constitutional, the elected branches have
ample room to reach separate and independent judgments. What happens
when a court finds that something is unconstitutional? Are the elected
branches then prohibited from engaging in that practice? That is not our
history or practice. In Dred Scott, the Court held that Congress could not
prohibit slavery in the territories and that blacks were not citizens.30 The
decision was eventually overturned by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments, but before that time, Congress and the executive
branch had taken steps to eviscerate the Court’s ruling. President Abraham
Lincoln set the stage for those challenges when he insisted, in his 1861
24.
25.
26.
3422).
27.
28.
29.
30.

425 U.S. 435 (1976).
Id. at 438.
Pub. L. No. 95–630, 92 Stat. 3697 (1978) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–
124 CONG. REC. 33,310 (1978).
Id.
Id. at 33,836.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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inaugural address, that the Court was a coequal, not superior, branch of
government. He rejected the idea that constitutional questions could be settled
solely by the Court. If government policy on “vital questions affecting the
whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court . . .
the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent
practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent
tribunal.”31
In 1862, Congress passed legislation that prohibited slavery in the
territories.32 If the Court was considered the superior branch of government
when deciding constitutional matters, one would think that someone during the
legislative debate would have objected that Congress could not, by statute,
reverse the Court’s ruling. No one even mentioned the decision.33 Members
of Congress never doubted their constitutional authority to prohibit slavery in
the territories and reach independent interpretations, with or without the Court.
In 1862, another part of Dred Scott went by the boards. Attorney General
Edward Bates issued a legal opinion, holding that neither color nor race could
deny American blacks their right of citizenship. He noted that “freemen of all
colors” had voted in some of the states, and that the idea of denying citizenship
on the ground of color was met by other nations “with incredulity, if not
disgust.”34 The Constitution is “silent about race as it is about color.”35
Turning to Dred Scott, Bates said that the case, “as it stands of record, does not
determine, nor purport to determine,” the question of blacks to be citizens.36
He regarded what Chief Justice Taney said about citizenship as pure dicta and
“of no authority as a judicial decision.”37 Bates concluded: “the free man of
color . . . if born in the United States, is a citizen of the United States.”38
The child-labor cases also demonstrate that the Court’s “finality” depends
on the mood of the country and the determination of private citizens and
members of Congress to successively, and successfully, challenge the
judiciary. A 1916 statute, relying on the commerce power to regulate child
labor, was struck down by the Court within two years.39 In 1919, Congress
tried again, this time by invoking the taxing power. When the constitutionality

31. 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1897, at 9
(James D. Richardson ed., 1897).
32. 12 Stat. 432 (1862).
33. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2030, 2041–54, 2061–64, 2066–69, 2618, 2624,
2769 (1862).
34. 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 382, 387, 397 (1862).
35. Id. at 398.
36. Id. at 409.
37. Id. at 412.
38. Id. at 413.
39. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
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of this statute was challenged, Solicitor General James Beck advised the Court
to invalidate congressional statutes only when absolutely necessary: “The
impression is general—and I believe that it is a mischievous one—that the
judiciary has an unlimited power to nullify a law if its incidental effect is in
excess of the governmental sphere of the enacting body.”40 He said it was an
“erroneous idea” that the Court is the “sole guardian and protector of our
constitutional form of government,” for that belief would lead to an
impairment with Congress and the people of “what may be called the
constitutional conscience.”41
The Court paid no heed, striking down the second statute as
unconstitutional.42 Congress responded by drafting a constitutional amendment
to give it the power to regulate child labor, but by 1937 only twenty-eight of
the necessary thirty-six states had ratified the amendment. After the ill-fated
court-packing plan of 1937, Congress included a child-labor provision in the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, returning to the commerce power as its
constitutional source of authority. With the replacement of several
conservative Justices by more liberal Justices, the dispute returned to the Court
in 1941, where the child-labor provision was upheld unanimously.43
This struggle between Congress and the Court was exceptionally long,
stretching from 1916 to 1941, but no one should have doubted that if Congress
persisted, it would prevail. The Court later admitted in 1946 that “the history
of judicial limitation of congressional power over commerce, when exercised
affirmatively, has been more largely one of retreat than of ultimate victory.”44
Justice Owen Roberts, after retiring from the Court, reconsidered his position
on the Commerce Clause and came to understand why the legislative branch
eventually triumphed: “Looking back, it is difficult to see how the Court could
have resisted the popular urge for uniform standards throughout the country—
for what in effect was a unified economy.”45
A more nuanced confrontation between the Court and the elected branches
takes the form of the legislative veto. Ever since 1932, Congress had used a
one-House, two-House, or even committee/subcommittee veto to control
executive actions. Presidents and agencies would submit to Congress certain
proposals for congressional review during a specific period of days, allowing
either the House, the Senate, committees, or subcommittees to disapprove.
Obviously this form of congressional control fell short of the regular legislative
40. 21 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 59 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).
41. Id.
42. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
43. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
44. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 415 (1946).
45. OWEN J. ROBERTS, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 61 (1951).
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process: action by both Houses and presentation of a bill to the President.
Soon the courts began reviewing the constitutionality of this mechanism.
When the dispute reached the Supreme Court and was argued there, I
wrote a lengthy article for a newspaper, predicting that however the Court
ruled, the legislative veto would survive because it satisfied basic needs of the
legislative and executive branches.46 The agencies wanted broad delegations
of authority; Congress insisted on some means of control without having to
pass a new law. I concluded that “with or without the legislative veto,
Congress will remain knee-deep in administrative decisions, and it is
inconceivable that any court or any president can prevent this. Call it
supervision, intervention, interference or plain meddling, Congress will find a
way.”47
The next year, in INS v. Chadha, the Court struck down the legislative veto
as an unconstitutional technique used by Congress to oversee the executive
branch.48 It held that future legislative efforts to control the President or
executive agencies would have to satisfy two tests: bicameralism and
presentment.49 Congressional action would have to pass both Houses of
Congress and be submitted to the President for his signature or veto.50 Yet, as
I predicted, Congress continued to use committee and subcommittee vetoes to
approve or disapprove agency actions.51 These statutory provisions typically
require agencies to obtain the prior approval of the Appropriations Committees
(actually, the subcommittees).52 In the more than two decades after Chadha,
hundreds of these statutory provisions have been enacted into law.53 Upon
learning that the legislative veto remains in force after it was declared
unconstitutional, professors of Constitutional Law express genuine amazement.
The Court, they find, did not have the last word.
By misreading history, congressional procedures, and executive-legislative
relations, the Court tried to command the elected branches to follow a
lawmaking process that was impractical and unworkable for both sides.
Neither executive agencies nor Congress wanted the static and formalistic
model fashioned by the Court. Finding the Chadha doctrine at odds with
effective government, the elected branches simply continued understandings

46. See Louis Fisher, Congress Can’t Lose On Its Veto Power, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1982,
at D1.
47. Id. at D5.
48. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
49. Id. at 952–58.
50. Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 273, 274 (1993).
51. Id. at 273.
52. Id. at 289–90.
53. Id. at 273.
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and procedures that had been in place before 1983. By and large, these
executive-legislative accommodations—and not the Court’s ruling—describe
how things work in Washington, D.C.
VI. PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
Students are taught that courts are uniquely reliable guardians of individual
rights and that without close judicial supervision the freedoms enshrined in the
Bill of Rights would have little chance of survival. This attitude is fairly new.
Federal courts for the first century and a half handled few cases involving free
speech, free press, religious liberty, or even criminal procedures, and when
they did intervene to adjudicate questions of individual rights they usually
defended—up to the 1930s—government or corporations.
Henry W. Edgerton, who later became a federal district judge, wrote an
article in 1937 that examined the thesis that judicial supremacy is necessary to
restrain Congress from infringing upon individual liberty.54 He studied the
Court’s record from 1789 to the mid-1930s and found little evidence that the
Court was the great protector of individual and minority rights.55 With few
exceptions, the Court consistently favored governmental power over individual
rights, lent support to harmful business activities, deprived blacks of
protection, upheld business interests over labor interests, and defended private
wealth against taxation.56 Of course, federal courts have been much more
active since then in protecting personal freedoms, but their record in
safeguarding minority and individual rights has never been that attractive or
reliable.
The work I have done in religious liberty illustrates how frequently the
regular political process is a more dependable protector of individual rights
than the courts. Many principles of personal freedom come not from the
judicial or legislative branches but from the community at large. A good
example is conscientious objection. The courts and Congress have been active
in this area, but fundamentally the right comes from the public at large,
accepting from an early date that some individuals have a religious or moral
commitment not to kill and that their right to be exempt from military service,
or at least combat duty, is entitled to protection.57
An incident during the Civil War shows how the regular political process,
and not the courts, can protect minority rights. In 1861, a congressional statute

54. See Henry W. Edgerton, The Incidence of Judicial Control Over Congress, 22 CORNELL
L. Q. 299 (1937).
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. LOUIS FISHER, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA: POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS 82–104
(2002).
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required military chaplains to be regular ordained ministers of a “Christian
denomination.”58 A largely Jewish regiment in Pennsylvania decided that the
statute needed to be changed and broadened. They turned not to the courts but
to President Lincoln and Congress. Through quiet lobbying and persuasion,
the statute was amended to delete “Christian denomination” and insert “some
religious denomination.”59 No one at that time thought it necessary or
appropriate to “take the matter to court.”
The rights of women to pursue their professional careers were protected
initially not in the courts but in legislatures, and all-male bodies at that. In
1872, the Supreme Court denied that the rejection of Myra Bradwell to practice
law in Illinois (solely because she was a woman) represented a violation of the
privileges and immunities of the Fourteenth Amendment.60 At that time, a rule
adopted by the Court also prohibited women from practicing there. In 1879,
Congress passed legislation to authorize a woman who had been a member of
the bar for three years, and who qualified on moral character, to practice before
the U.S. Supreme Court.61 A few members of Congress thought that it was
inappropriate to interfere with the Court’s internal rules, but the great majority
insisted that what was at stake was national policy and that Congress was the
body to decide it. In the words of Senator Aaron Sargent:
No man has a right to put a limit to the exertions or the sphere of woman. That
is a right which only can be possessed by that sex itself. . . . The enjoyment of
liberty, the pursuit of happiness in her own way, is as much a birthright of
woman as of man. In this land man has ceased to dominate over his fellow—
let him cease to dominate over his sister; for he has no higher right to do that
latter than the former.62

The Supreme Court did not wake up to the rights of women until almost a
century later. In 1971, for the first time, the Court acted to strike down sex
discrimination.63 The judicial record up to that time was so deplorable that one
study, published in a law review, remarked: “Our conclusion, independently
reached, but completely shared, is that by and large the performance of
American judges in the area of sex discrimination can be succinctly described
as ranging from poor to abominable.”64 Much of the drive for an Equal Rights
Amendment was to shake the courts into consciousness. During a House
debate in 1971, Rep. Martha Griffiths explained that what the amendment
58. Ch. 9, § 9, 12 Stat. 270 (1861); ch. 42, § 7, 12 Stat. 288 (1861).
59. Ch. 200, § 8, 12 Stat. 595 (1862); see FISHER, supra note 57, at 51.
60. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
61. 20 Stat. 292 (1879).
62. 8 CONG. REC. 1084 (1879); FISHER, supra note 2, at 829 (6th ed. 2005).
63. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
64. John D. Johnston, Jr. & Charles L. Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in
Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 676 (1971).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

648

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:633

sought to do, “and all it seeks to do, is to say to the Supreme Court of the
United States, ‘Wake up! This is the 20th century. Before it is over, judge
women as individual human beings.’”65
Many contemporary examples underscore the effectiveness of the political
process. Although the Supreme Court received much credit for its
desegregation ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, the decision produced
little change, in part because of the weak implementation decision issued the
following year.66 What moved the country forward was not additional judicial
rulings, but action by the elected branches: the Civil Rights Act of 1964,67 the
Voting Rights Act of 1965,68 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.69 Through
this statutory action, the legislative and executive branches, operating through
presidential statements, committee hearings, and congressional debate, were
able to educate the country and create a bipartisan consensus that was far
stronger and more effective than anything that could come from a court.
What is true with regard to individual rights and civil rights is true also
with respect to criminal procedures. In 1978, the Supreme Court reviewed the
constitutionality of a police search of a student newspaper that had taken
photographs of a clash between demonstrators and police.70 The government
issued a search warrant to obtain the photos in an effort to discover the
identities of those who fought with police officers.71 The Court held that
search warrants are not prevented simply because the owner of a place is not
reasonably suspected of criminal involvement.72 The newspaper was not
suspected; it was a third party. Nevertheless, the Court decided that lawenforcement officials could seek a warrant and enter the premises of a
newspaper to conduct a search for evidence against another party.73
The Court’s decision triggered nationwide protests and congressional
hearings. Newspapers denounced the ruling as “‘a first step toward a police
state,’ an assault that ‘stands on its head the history of both the [F]irst and the
[F]ourth [A]mendments,’” and a threat to the “‘privacy rights of the lawabiding.’”74 The Court had invited Congress to legislate if it considered the
Court’s decision too restrictive on free press rights, but the Court limited

65.
66.
(1955).
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

FISHER, supra note 2, at 1025.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown v. Bd. of Educ, 349 U.S. 294
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a–2000h-6 (2000).
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973p (2000).
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2000); see FISHER, supra note 2, at 773, 970, 789.
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 550–52 (1978).
Id. at 551.
Id. at 560.
Id.
FISHER, supra note 2, at 701.
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Congress to providing “nonconstitutional protections against possible abuses
of the search warrant procedure.”75 The word “nonconstitutional” was the
Court’s way of pretending that it possessed a monopoly over constitutional
questions, but Congress was being asked to do precisely what the Court had
done: balance the interests of law enforcement against a free press. Congress
passed legislation to protect newsrooms from searches by requiring, with
certain exceptions, a subpoena instead of the more intrusive warrant.76
Another remarkable example of the capacity of the legislative process to
protect minority rights occurred in 1980.77 Adult members of the Klamath
tribe in Oregon twice voted to surrender the special trust status of Indian lands
in return for cash.78 Edison Chiloquin, a member of the tribe, voted both times
against the transfer.79 As an act of protest, he built a tepee in the forest,
became a squatter, and kept a sacred fire lit.80 He would have had no chance in
court, but in 1980 Congress passed a private bill to set land aside for Chiloquin
with the condition that its use “shall not be inconsistent with its cultural,
historical, and archeological character.”81 The “majoritarian” Congress not
only protected the interests of a minority, but a minority within a minority.
VII. THERE ARE FIFTY-ONE CONSTITUTIONS
How often do professors in political science departments and law schools
remind their students that the United States has fifty–one constitutions, not
one? I suspect rarely. By relying on their own constitutions and statutes,
states can reach constitutional decisions that are not only markedly different
from Supreme Court rulings but also are more protective of individual rights
and more restrictive of what the government can do. The U.S. Constitution
provides only a minimum, or floor, for the protection of individual rights and
liberties. As the Court noted in 1980, each state has the “sovereign right to
adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those
conferred by the Federal Constitution.”82
Students are apt to believe that major innovations to safeguard defendants
come from rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court, such as the famous Gideon
decision in 1963 that granted indigent defendants the right to counsel provided
75. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 567.
76. Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (1980) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000aa).
77. See Priv. L. No. 96–68, 94 Stat. 3613 (1980); FISHER, supra note 57, at 171–72; Louis
Fisher, Indian Religious Freedom: To Litigate or Legislate?, 26 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (2002).
78. FISHER, supra note 57, at 171–72.
79. Id. at 172.
80. Id.
81. Priv. L. No. 96–68, 94 Stat. 3613 (1980).
82. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
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by the government.83 However, states had figured that out more than a century
before. In 1854, the Supreme Court of Indiana stated that a “civilized
community” could not prosecute a poor person and withhold counsel.84 Five
years later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court called it a “mockery” to promise a
pauper a fair trial but tell him he must employ his own counsel.85 Congress
passed legislation in 1892 to provide counsel to represent poor persons.86
“Landmark” rulings by the Supreme Court are usually staged efforts that give
blessing to spadework and heavy lifting already done by the states and
Congress.
In the Everson and Allen rulings, the Supreme Court held that states may
use public funds to assist religious and sectarian schools for such expenses as
transportation and textbooks.87 Like the Morrison ruling on independent
counsels, judicial support for a practice does not mandate it. States are at
liberty to interpret their own constitutions and conclude that the use of public
funds to assist religious schools in any manner is prohibited.88 The Court
justified this financial assistance to sectarian schools on the basis of the “childbenefit” theory: the funds benefited the children, not the school. Many state
courts dismissed that theory as wholly untenable and unpersuasive.89
When students reach the end of a Supreme Court decision they are likely to
read magisterial language, stating that the lower court decision “is reversed,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
Is that evidence that the Court, at least in this decision, has the last word? No,
it is not. It means only that the case is going back down, and unless you follow
the trail to the bottom, you will not know how things turned out. It could well
be that the lower court triumphs over the Supreme Court. A constitutional
absurdity? Not at all.
Consider a case out of the state of Washington. In 1980, the Supreme
Court of Washington held that a university police officer had exceeded his
authority by seizing incriminating evidence from a student’s room.90 It thus
barred the state from introducing the evidence at trial. The U.S. Supreme
Court reversed, holding that its “plain view” doctrine permits a law
enforcement officer to seize incriminating evidence when the officer is in a

83. Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
84. Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13 (1854).
85. Carpenter v. Dane, 9 Wis. 249, 251 (1859).
86. 27 Stat. 252 (1892).
87. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
88. See FISHER, supra note 2, at 602.
89. See Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. Riles, 632 P.2d 953, 962 (Cal. 1981); Matthews v. Quinton,
362 P.2d 932, 936 (Alaska 1961).
90. State v. Chrisman, 619 P.2d 971 (Wash. 1980).
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place where the officer has a right to be.91 Now comes the magic language.
The Court remanded the case to Washington “for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.”92 I know a Justice who was on the Supreme
Court of Washington at that time, and I asked whether he and his colleagues
knew what to do when the case came back. He said, regarding the U.S.
Supreme Court: “We are going to stick it in its ear.” Determined to exercise
the independent, sovereign powers available to the state, they rejected the
Court’s “plain view” doctrine and excluded the evidence.93 Who had the final
word? The state.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The type of dialogue discussed thus far concerns the cases that courts
accept and agree to adjudicate. A significant number of constitutional issues
are resolved entirely through the political process because no answer is
forthcoming from the courts. For example, the Constitution provides that a
“regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public
Money shall be published from time to time.”94 Despite this constitutional
admonition to inform the public how government funds are spent, the Central
Intelligence Agency and the rest of the Intelligence Community are funded in
secret. Efforts to obtain a decision on the merits from the Supreme Court have
been turned aside on the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing.95
The meaning of the Statement and Account Clause is therefore left entirely
to the judgment of Congress and the President. Through the use of a variety of
threshold requirements—standing, mootness, ripeness, political questions, and
other tests—plaintiffs who seek answers on constitutional questions and
individual rights are frequently turned away by the courts.96 The matter then
returns to the political arena to be disposed of there. Many separation of power
disputes are decided, constitutionally, totally outside the courts.97
Justice Robert H. Jackson once remarked: “We are not final because we
are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”98 Typical of his
writing, the phrase is masterful, elegant, and almost compelling. But who
familiar with American history could say that the Court is either infallible or
final? The cleverness of Jackson’s remark does not save it. The lack of
91. Wash v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 9 (1982).
92. Id. at 10.
93. FISHER, supra note 2, at 21.
94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6.
95. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175 (1974).
96. FISHER, supra note 2, at 75–114.
97. Louis Fisher, Separation of Powers: Interpretation Outside the Courts, 18 PEPP. L. REV.
57, 57 (1990).
98. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953).
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finality in Court rulings is evident to anyone who studies the independent roles
exerted by states, Congress, the President, and the political process. If a Court
ruling does not sit well with the general public, it will not stand for long.
On occasion, there is a need for a binding decision by the Court to dispose
of such matters as the Little Rock desegregation crisis of 195899 or the standoff
between the judiciary and President Richard Nixon over the Watergate
tapes.100 The country looked appreciatively to the Court’s capacity to speak
the final word. This type of case is the exception, however. For the most part,
when courts decide a case it is Katy bar the door.
There is no reason for elected officials or the public to defer automatically
to the judiciary because of its supposed technical skills and political
independence. Much of constitutional law depends on fact-finding and the
balancing of competing values, areas in which the legislative branch at both the
national and state level can claim substantial expertise. What is “final” at one
stage of national debate is always open to revision, fresh interpretation, and
reversals or modifications of court doctrines. Elected officials have the
authority and competence to participate constructively in constitutional
interpretation. Through this political process, the public has an opportunity to
add legitimacy and meaning to what might otherwise be an alien and shortlived document. In the search for a harmony between constitutional law and
self-government, all citizens have a right and a need to participate. This open
process is in the interest of a democratic republic and is very much in the
interest of preserving an independent and resilient judiciary.

99. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
100. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).

